I grew up during the Cold War, thus I remember:
- Routine air raid drills
at school
- Frequent advertising for
underground air raid shelters to be installed in backyards
- “On the Beach”, a 1959 movie which depicted the results of nuclear war
- Looking out my high school window during the 1962 Cuban Missile crisis, wondering if I’d be
able to see missiles launched by the Soviet Union to attack our Groton
Connecticut nuclear submarine base 50 miles away.
- The 1964 movie “Dr.
Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb”, a
comedy about a berserk US General who launches nuclear missiles.
- Traveling in Europe and
realizing the fear of citizens in other countries that the USA and USSR
could trigger a world-ending war over which they had no control.
At that time, only the USA and the Soviet Union (United
Soviet Socialist Republic or USSR, often mis-identified as “Russia”, which was
its most populous member) had nuclear capabilities.
Mutual destruction was the deterrent that
avoided nuclear war.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT;
https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/)
was signed in 1970, ushering a period during which fear of nuclear war subsided
greatly.
The fall of the Soviet Union
generally reduced fear further, although there was
concern that the USSR’s nuclear arsenal might not be adequately secured, hence
might be vulnerable to being stolen by (or sold to) terrorists.
Unfortunately, countries have several natural incentives to develop
nuclear weapons:
- To reduce the
risk that other countries will attack or otherwise “push around” your
country.
- To help your country achieve an aggressive expansionist foreign
policy.
- As a source of national pride and to encourage scientists to remain
in your country.
The nuclear risk is fundamentally different than all other risks as it could suddenly destroy our planet and becomes increasingly likely as nuclear weapons spread. To counter the above incentives, the
world must convince governments that the disadvantages of developing nuclear
weapons outweigh the advantages.
The
disadvantages could include:
a)
Sanctions: Clearly the best approach, sanctions must
have teeth and be broadly supported internationally. Unfortunately, it can be very profitable for
a country or business to undercut sanctions and it is hard to maintain them
long-term.
b)
Pre-emptive strikes:
These require early knowledge, a commitment to act, and precise
attacks. If one country acts as the
policeman of the world, others will fear it and it
may lack the morality to do its job appropriately consistently. If the pre-emptive strike requires
international co-operation, it may be subject to subterfuge and lack of
timeliness.
c)
Shunning/embarrassment:
Such suasion is not likely to work.
d)
We could share peaceful nuclear technology to reduce
the need/excuse for developing nuclear capability which can be transformed into
weapons and to help create a positive, cooperative international culture
relative to nuclear weapons.
e)
Other suggestions are welcome!
Unfortunately, we’ve created a situation in which governments logically expect to negotiate economic advantages by developing nuclear weapons (“nuclear blackmail”). We encourage proliferation in that way and then those countries' enemies feel a need to develop nuclear weapons. The resulting nuclear research can exacerbate the situation further by creating easier and less detectable methods of developing (smaller) nuclear weapons.
You might stop reading here.
Or you might like to keep reading for a description of our “Agreed
Framework” with North Korea and discussion of what has happened since, including
criticism of President Bush’s decision to cooperate with India relative to
nuclear weapons and of President Obama’s negotiations with Iran.
Relative to North Korea (DPRK, the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea), detailed timelines can be found at the following web-sites:
In 1992, the International
Atomic Energy Commission concluded that North Korea was in violation of the
NPT. Rather than submitting to more
inspections, North Korea announced that it would withdraw from the pact. It subsequently suspended the decision to
withdraw and suggested negotiations with the USA.
Eventually, Jimmy Carter
re-opened stalled negotiations, going to North Korea in a gesture that he and
the USA government described as independent of the USA government. Subsequently, there have been reports that
President Clinton recruited him to make that overture. (Does this suggest that 100% transparency may
not always be the best policy? People
love to speak in absolutes, but the world is not that simple.)
Joint U.S.-North Korean Obligations:
·
The United States and North Korea
committed to move toward normalizing economic and political relations,
including by reducing barriers to investment, opening liaison offices, and ultimately
exchanging ambassadors. (CT: This was a good idea, presuming that the
reasons for having broken relations were being removed by this agreement and
that this agreement did not block future sanctions that might become
appropriate.)
·
Both sides commit not to nuclearize
the Korean Peninsula. The United States must "provide formal
assurances" not to threaten or use nuclear weapons against North Korea.
Pyongyang is required to "consistently take steps" to implement the
1992 North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula.
North Korean Obligations
·
Reactor Freeze and Dismantlement: The
framework calls for North Korea to freeze operation of its 5-megawatt reactor
and plutonium-reprocessing plant at Yongbyon and construction of a 50-megawatt
reactor at Yongbyon and a 200-megawatt plant at Taechon. These facilities are
to be dismantled prior to the completion of the second light-water reactor.
·
Inspections: North
Korea must come into "full compliance" with IAEA safeguards when a
"significant portion of the [light-water reactor] project is completed,
but before delivery of key nuclear components." Full compliance includes
taking all steps deemed necessary by the IAEA to determine the extent to which
North Korea diverted material for weapons use in the past, including giving
inspectors access to all nuclear facilities in the country. (CT: This provision seems to have been deficient
because the timing was vague, despite the good “before delivery of nuclear
components” wording, and deferred. It
takes several years to complete inspection, so the light-water
reactor project would have to be delayed if inspections were deferred in this
fashion. According to Wikipedia, the
chairman of the IAEA, Hans Blix, expressed this concern.)
·
Spent Fuel: The
spent fuel from North Korea's 5-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon is to be put into
containers as soon as possible (a process called "canning") and
removed from the country when nuclear components for the first light-water
reactor begin to arrive after North Korea has come into full compliance with
IAEA safeguards. (CT: The USA paid for this
process, but that does NOT seem to create an incentive for other countries to
develop nuclear weapons.)
·
NPT Membership: The
Agreed Framework requires that North Korea remain a party to the nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty.
U.S. Obligations
·
Establish and Organize KEDO: This
includes the securing of diplomatic and legal rights and guarantees necessary
to implement the light-water reactor project. (CT: KEDO stands for “Korean Peninsula Energy Development
Organization” which was intended to implement the agreement.)
·
Implement the Light-Water Reactor
Project: The United States is to facilitate the construction
of two 1,000-megawatt light-water nuclear power reactors. (CT: Japan and South Korea were supposed to
finance and supply North Korea with these light-water reactors, estimated to
cost $4.5 billion or $8 billion, depending on source (John McCain referred to
it as two $4 billion reactors). Replacing 255 megawatt capacity with 2000
megawatt capacity appears to have rewarded North Korea for having created its
nuclear capability. Replacing with a 250
megawatt capacity would have avoided incentivizing nuclear proliferation, but
North Korea may not have accepted such an offer. I’d expect our negotiators to say that North
Korea did not accept such a proposal, but you can’t be sure unless you walk
away in a fashion that convinces the other side that you will not sweeten the
offer.)
·
Provide Heavy-Fuel Oil Shipments: To
compensate for the electricity-generating capacity that Pyongyang gave up by
freezing its nuclear reactors, KEDO will supply North Korea with 500,000 metric
tons of heavy-fuel oil annually until the light-water reactor project is completed. (CT:
Estimated to cost $0.5 billion. This did NOT reward North Korea because it
replaced what their nuclear reactor would have produced.)
According to Wikipedia, “The pact was neither a treaty subject
to Senate approval nor a legally binding executive agreement,
but a non-binding political commitment between the two countries noted by
the United
Nations Security Council.” (CT: It seems strange that North Korea would
have accepted such terms and strange for us as well. Perhaps Bill Clinton did not think he could
get this through Congress.)
I’ve heard someone involved in the above negotiation say
that “we did not have a choice”. It
seems that our negotiators concluded that North
Korea would not accept a less attractive offer and we were unwilling to risk that
North Korea would irrationally attack the South if the existing reactor was
attacked. At best, saying that
“we did not have a choice” is an incorrect statement. At worst, it indicates that our negotiators
bargained poorly by mentally painting themselves into a corner.
What happened subsequently?
The timeline links above can help you work through what happened. But there are many lessons to be learned:
a)
The discussions treat the North Korea situation as a
series of Korean incidents, isolated from broader impact. They tend to ignore the impact that the North
Korean situation has on other countries and, to a lesser degree, ignore the
impact of situations with other countries on North Korea. As noted above, I believe we have
incentivized other countries to develop nuclear weapons.
b)
North Korea developed offensive missiles, which had not
been restricted in the 1994 agreement. Subsequently,
when negotiating with Iran, the Obama administration (apparently having learned
from the North Korea situation) insisted that missile restrictions be part of
any agreement with Iran. However, the
Obama administration surrendered on that issue, which is one of the reasons I
believe it negotiated poorly. President
Obama made it clear that he would sacrifice important demands in order to reach
an agreement.
c)
North Korea provided missile capacity to other
countries (such as Iran in 1996, Pakistan in 1998, and Yemen in 2002,
reportedly), reportedly exported nuclear knowledge to Libya in 2004 and
threatened to give nuclear weapons to terrorists in 2005. (Note: Another concern I had with the Iran
deal was that it did not preclude Iran working on developing nuclear weapons
with allies outside of Iran.)
d)
Naturally, based on past success, North Korea demanded
financial compensation in return for ceasing missile development and trade. At times, North Korea has demanded $1 billion
annually. It has insisted on support
launching North Korean satellites, energy support and food support, in
negotiations which have failed.
e)
The USA imposed sanctions. North Korea stated that the USA had
negotiated away its right to impose sanctions for non-nuclear reasons.
f)
The USA and its allies were slow in building the
light-water reactors and in supplying energy.
g)
In 1998, India tested a nuclear weapon. India and Pakistan were two countries that
did not sign the NPT.
h)
In 2001, the Bush Administration was inaugurated. North Korea reacted strongly to a muted
comment by the Bush Administration.
j)
President Bush left nuclear warfare on the table as a
possible response to North Korean transgressions and promised not to initiate a
nuclear attack on North Korea. I
supported that part of Bush’s position as I think we need both a carrot and a stick,
but when Bush labelled North Korea as part of an “Axis of Evil”, along with
Iraq and Iran, in 2002, I felt he was not being helpful. In September 2002, the Bush
administration released a report which emphasized pre-emptively attacking
countries developing weapons of mass destruction. It explicitly mentioned North
Korea. Such a threat may be
necessary. Many of our negotiators,
politicians, academics and media presume that a preemptive strike against a
North Korean nuclear site would result in North Korea unleashing an attack on
South Korea. It is entirely appropriate
to be concerned about that risk but I think it is inappropriate to blindly
assume that North Korea will act irrationally.
Its behavior relative to nuclear weapons does not seem to have been
irrational to me.
k)
In 2002, it apparently became clear that North Korea was
enriching uranium. The USA said that North
Korea admitted doing so. After a while, North
Korea claimed that it had said it had a right to do so, rather than that it had
done so and in 2003, it denied having done so.
It seems that either there was a breach of the agreement (the USA
position) or proof that the agreement did not serve our purposes (the North
Korea claim of its right), perhaps because we had been unable to predict all
the future ways that might develop to create nuclear weapons. However, it can be argued that North Korea’s “right”
resulted from the USA not fulfilling its responsibilities. I’ve heard a person involved in the original
negotiation lament that the Bush administration did not engage in diplomacy at
that time. I’m uncomfortable that his
comments suggest to me that he felt we should have continued to “buy off” North
Korea.
l)
In 2002, North Korea restarted its banned nuclear sites,
which the IAEA condemned in early 2003. North
Korea claimed to have a workable nuclear device. (CT: Seems unlikely that North
Korea could have had a workable nuclear device at this time if it had complied
with the Agreed Framework.)
m)
In 2006, the Bush administration decided to support
India’s nuclear capability, convincing Congress to approve an exemption to the
Atomic Energy Act for this deal.
Eight
of India’s 22 nuclear sites were intended for military use, according to
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/18/AR2006121800233.html.
I was appalled by Bush’s attitude that the
USA can decide who should be allowed to have nuclear weapons.
n)
More broadly, President Bush turned USA foreign policy
on its head by trumpeting our “right” to engage in preemptive war if we feared
another country. This statement
particularly upset me as it undermined the USA’s valuable historical position of
favoring world peace. Once trust is
lost, it is hard to regain. Prior to the
Bush administration, I had never observed the military-industrial complex about
which President Eisenhower had warned us.
Bush’s military-industrial hawks scared me greatly. Please note that this paragraph does not
denigrate the threat of a pre-emptive surgical strike against a nuclear weapons
site; I am criticizing Bush for justifying general aggression based on fear.
o)
Republicans repeatedly criticized the Agreed Framework
as an appeasement to North Korea. In
doing so, they inadvertently underscored the ability of other countries to
blackmail us by developing nuclear weapons.
p)
As noted above, President Obama negotiated what I
believe to be a weak agreement with Iran.
Although I did not like his agreement, I concluded that I would have
voted for it reluctantly, had I been in Congress, because our Presidents need
to have negotiating authority. If not,
other countries will never want to negotiate with our administrations. See my September 2015 blog.
Diplomacy is a great tactic.
But as Teddy Roosevelt said “Speak softly and carry a big stick.” It is NOT good diplomacy to incentivize
countries to create nuclear weapons.
If we want to avoid nuclear proliferation (which is
something we SHOULD want to avoid), there have to be strong negative
consequences for a country that develops nuclear weapons. If strong consequences are assured, we can
minimize the number of occurrences.
Diplomacy would also be more effective and could be accomplished (not
necessarily in all cases) by avoiding the negative consequences rather than
giving incentives.
What could we do?
a)
We could make peaceful nuclear process scientific
information readily available.
b)
We could create strong sanctions. (Note: it is not clear that we could create
strong sanctions in every case. It would
be important to have an international agreement in advance that stipulated the
strong sanctions and committed all signatories to obey the sanctions, with another
set of prescribed sanctions applying to countries which undercut such a
sanction.)
c)
We could apply surgical strikes to destroy budding
nuclear facilities. There are great risks
in a situation in which one country has unilateral capability to do unilateral
strikes of such type. Many USA citizens
are blind to some of the risk because they think we are always right. Even if we were always right (which I don’t
accept), if we were a unilateral international policeman, we would stimulate
terrorist attacks against us. Therefore,
it would make sense to consider an international approach.
I don’t know the right answer and the right answer may
shift from one situation to another.
However, I fear that we negotiate with a short-term view,
inadvertently increasing the risk significantly.
