Non-Proliferation (some focus on North Korea)

I grew up during the Cold War, thus I remember:

• Routine air raid drills at school
• Frequent advertising for underground air raid shelters to be installed in backyards
• “On the Beach”, a 1959 movie which depicted the results of nuclear war
• Looking out my high school window during the 1962 Cuban Missile crisis, wondering if I’d be able to see missiles launched by the Soviet Union to attack our Groton Connecticut nuclear submarine base 50 miles away.
• The 1964 movie “Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb”, a comedy about a berserk US General who launches nuclear missiles.
• Traveling in Europe and realizing the fear of citizens in other countries that the USA and USSR could trigger a world-ending war over which they had no control.

At that time, only the USA and the Soviet Union (United Soviet Socialist Republic or USSR, often mis-identified as “Russia”, which was its most populous member) had nuclear capabilities.  Mutual destruction was the deterrent that avoided nuclear war.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT; https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/) was signed in 1970, ushering a period during which fear of nuclear war subsided greatly.  The fall of the Soviet Union generally reduced fear further, although there was concern that the USSR’s nuclear arsenal might not be adequately secured, hence might be vulnerable to being stolen by (or sold to) terrorists.

Unfortunately, countries have several natural incentives to develop nuclear weapons:

1. To reduce the risk that other countries will attack or otherwise “push around” your country.
2. To help your country achieve an aggressive expansionist foreign policy.
3. As a source of national pride and to encourage scientists to remain in your country.

The nuclear risk is fundamentally different than all other risks as it could suddenly destroy our planet and becomes increasingly likely as nuclear weapons spread.  To counter the above incentives, the world must convince governments that the disadvantages of developing nuclear weapons outweigh the advantages.  The disadvantages could include:

a)      Sanctions: Clearly the best approach, sanctions must have teeth and be broadly supported internationally.  Unfortunately, it can be very profitable for a country or business to undercut sanctions and it is hard to maintain them long-term.

b)      Pre-emptive strikes:  These require early knowledge, a commitment to act, and precise attacks.  If one country acts as the policeman of the world, others will fear it and it may lack the morality to do its job appropriately consistently.  If the pre-emptive strike requires international co-operation, it may be subject to subterfuge and lack of timeliness.

c)      Shunning/embarrassment:  Such suasion is not likely to work.

d)     We could share peaceful nuclear technology to reduce the need/excuse for developing nuclear capability which can be transformed into weapons and to help create a positive, cooperative international culture relative to nuclear weapons.

e)      Other suggestions are welcome!

Unfortunately, we’ve created a situation in which governments logically expect to negotiate economic advantages by developing nuclear weapons (“nuclear blackmail”).  We encourage proliferation in that way and then those countries' enemies feel a need to develop nuclear weapons.  The resulting nuclear research can exacerbate the situation further by creating easier and less detectable methods of developing (smaller) nuclear weapons.
 

You might stop reading here.  Or you might like to keep reading for a description of our “Agreed Framework” with North Korea and discussion of what has happened since, including criticism of President Bush’s decision to cooperate with India relative to nuclear weapons and of President Obama’s negotiations with Iran.

Relative to North Korea (DPRK, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea), detailed timelines can be found at the following web-sites:

• https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/North Koreachron. 
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_North_Korean_nuclear_program

In 1992, the International Atomic Energy Commission concluded that North Korea was in violation of the NPT.  Rather than submitting to more inspections, North Korea announced that it would withdraw from the pact.  It subsequently suspended the decision to withdraw and suggested negotiations with the USA.

Negotiations broke down after the North Koreans took steps to hide their past actions, which had been defined as a “red line” by the USA, but then were resumed, per http://www.nytimes.com/1994/06/18/world/a-shift-on-north-korea.html?mcubz=0.

Eventually, Jimmy Carter re-opened stalled negotiations, going to North Korea in a gesture that he and the USA government described as independent of the USA government.  Subsequently, there have been reports that President Clinton recruited him to make that overture.  (Does this suggest that 100% transparency may not always be the best policy?  People love to speak in absolutes, but the world is not that simple.)

The “Agreed Framework” resulted, defined as follows according to https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/agreedframework.   (My parenthetical comments are labelled “CT:”.)

Joint U.S.-North Korean Obligations:

·         The United States and North Korea committed to move toward normalizing economic and political relations, including by reducing barriers to investment, opening liaison offices, and ultimately exchanging ambassadors.  (CT: This was a good idea, presuming that the reasons for having broken relations were being removed by this agreement and that this agreement did not block future sanctions that might become appropriate.)

·         Both sides commit not to nuclearize the Korean Peninsula. The United States must "provide formal assurances" not to threaten or use nuclear weapons against North Korea. Pyongyang is required to "consistently take steps" to implement the 1992 North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

North Korean Obligations

·         Reactor Freeze and Dismantlement: The framework calls for North Korea to freeze operation of its 5-megawatt reactor and plutonium-reprocessing plant at Yongbyon and construction of a 50-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon and a 200-megawatt plant at Taechon. These facilities are to be dismantled prior to the completion of the second light-water reactor.

·         Inspections: North Korea must come into "full compliance" with IAEA safeguards when a "significant portion of the [light-water reactor] project is completed, but before delivery of key nuclear components." Full compliance includes taking all steps deemed necessary by the IAEA to determine the extent to which North Korea diverted material for weapons use in the past, including giving inspectors access to all nuclear facilities in the country. (CT: This provision seems to have been deficient because the timing was vague, despite the good “before delivery of nuclear components” wording, and deferred.  It takes several years to complete inspection, so the light-water reactor project would have to be delayed if inspections were deferred in this fashion.  According to Wikipedia, the chairman of the IAEA, Hans Blix, expressed this concern.)

·         Spent Fuel: The spent fuel from North Korea's 5-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon is to be put into containers as soon as possible (a process called "canning") and removed from the country when nuclear components for the first light-water reactor begin to arrive after North Korea has come into full compliance with IAEA safeguards. (CT: The USA paid for this process, but that does NOT seem to create an incentive for other countries to develop nuclear weapons.)

·         NPT Membership: The Agreed Framework requires that North Korea remain a party to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

U.S. Obligations

·         Establish and Organize KEDO: This includes the securing of diplomatic and legal rights and guarantees necessary to implement the light-water reactor project. (CT: KEDO stands for “Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization” which was intended to implement the agreement.)

·         Implement the Light-Water Reactor Project: The United States is to facilitate the construction of two 1,000-megawatt light-water nuclear power reactors. (CT: Japan and South Korea were supposed to finance and supply North Korea with these light-water reactors, estimated to cost $4.5 billion or $8 billion, depending on source (John McCain referred to it as two $4 billion reactors).  Replacing 255 megawatt capacity with 2000 megawatt capacity appears to have rewarded North Korea for having created its nuclear capability.  Replacing with a 250 megawatt capacity would have avoided incentivizing nuclear proliferation, but North Korea may not have accepted such an offer.  I’d expect our negotiators to say that North Korea did not accept such a proposal, but you can’t be sure unless you walk away in a fashion that convinces the other side that you will not sweeten the offer.)

·         Provide Heavy-Fuel Oil Shipments: To compensate for the electricity-generating capacity that Pyongyang gave up by freezing its nuclear reactors, KEDO will supply North Korea with 500,000 metric tons of heavy-fuel oil annually until the light-water reactor project is completed.  (CT: Estimated to cost $0.5 billion. This did NOT reward North Korea because it replaced what their nuclear reactor would have produced.)

Full wording is available from http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/aptagframe.pdf.

According to Wikipedia, “The pact was neither a treaty subject to Senate approval nor a legally binding executive agreement, but a non-binding political commitment between the two countries noted by the United Nations Security Council.”  (CT: It seems strange that North Korea would have accepted such terms and strange for us as well.  Perhaps Bill Clinton did not think he could get this through Congress.)

I’ve heard someone involved in the above negotiation say that “we did not have a choice”.  It seems that our negotiators concluded that North Korea would not accept a less attractive offer and we were unwilling to risk that North Korea would irrationally attack the South if the existing reactor was attacked.  At best, saying that “we did not have a choice” is an incorrect statement.  At worst, it indicates that our negotiators bargained poorly by mentally painting themselves into a corner.

What happened subsequently?  The timeline links above can help you work through what happened.  But there are many lessons to be learned:

a)      The discussions treat the North Korea situation as a series of Korean incidents, isolated from broader impact.  They tend to ignore the impact that the North Korean situation has on other countries and, to a lesser degree, ignore the impact of situations with other countries on North Korea.  As noted above, I believe we have incentivized other countries to develop nuclear weapons.

b)      North Korea developed offensive missiles, which had not been restricted in the 1994 agreement.  Subsequently, when negotiating with Iran, the Obama administration (apparently having learned from the North Korea situation) insisted that missile restrictions be part of any agreement with Iran.  However, the Obama administration surrendered on that issue, which is one of the reasons I believe it negotiated poorly.  President Obama made it clear that he would sacrifice important demands in order to reach an agreement.

c)      North Korea provided missile capacity to other countries (such as Iran in 1996, Pakistan in 1998, and Yemen in 2002, reportedly), reportedly exported nuclear knowledge to Libya in 2004 and threatened to give nuclear weapons to terrorists in 2005.  (Note: Another concern I had with the Iran deal was that it did not preclude Iran working on developing nuclear weapons with allies outside of Iran.)

d)     Naturally, based on past success, North Korea demanded financial compensation in return for ceasing missile development and trade.  At times, North Korea has demanded $1 billion annually.  It has insisted on support launching North Korean satellites, energy support and food support, in negotiations which have failed.

e)      The USA imposed sanctions.  North Korea stated that the USA had negotiated away its right to impose sanctions for non-nuclear reasons.

f)       The USA and its allies were slow in building the light-water reactors and in supplying energy.

g)      In 1998, India tested a nuclear weapon.  India and Pakistan were two countries that did not sign the NPT.

h)      In 2001, the Bush Administration was inaugurated.  North Korea reacted strongly to a muted comment by the Bush Administration. 

i)        Joel Wit (who worked on the agreement for the USA) assigned blame to North Korea, South Korea, the Clinton Administration and Congressional Republicans in a 2001 statement (https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/what-should-we-do-with-the-u-s-north-korea-agreed-framework/).   Others blame either the North Koreans or the USA mostly.  Perhaps Wit was intending to be “diplomatic” in spreading the blame but he did identify problem behaviors by the various participants.  Although Wit supports diplomacy, his statement raises the possibility that diplomacy is doomed to failure.  John McCain expressed his concerns here: https://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/1995/6/post-137a3484-6bba-4855-a2e8-367b4d4ceb7d).

j)        President Bush left nuclear warfare on the table as a possible response to North Korean transgressions and promised not to initiate a nuclear attack on North Korea.  I supported that part of Bush’s position as I think we need both a carrot and a stick, but when Bush labelled North Korea as part of an “Axis of Evil”, along with Iraq and Iran, in 2002, I felt he was not being helpful.  In September 2002, the Bush administration released a report which emphasized pre-emptively attacking countries developing weapons of mass destruction. It explicitly mentioned North Korea.  Such a threat may be necessary.  Many of our negotiators, politicians, academics and media presume that a preemptive strike against a North Korean nuclear site would result in North Korea unleashing an attack on South Korea.  It is entirely appropriate to be concerned about that risk but I think it is inappropriate to blindly assume that North Korea will act irrationally.  Its behavior relative to nuclear weapons does not seem to have been irrational to me.

k)      In 2002, it apparently became clear that North Korea was enriching uranium.  The USA said that North Korea admitted doing so.  After a while, North Korea claimed that it had said it had a right to do so, rather than that it had done so and in 2003, it denied having done so.  It seems that either there was a breach of the agreement (the USA position) or proof that the agreement did not serve our purposes (the North Korea claim of its right), perhaps because we had been unable to predict all the future ways that might develop to create nuclear weapons.  However, it can be argued that North Korea’s “right” resulted from the USA not fulfilling its responsibilities.  I’ve heard a person involved in the original negotiation lament that the Bush administration did not engage in diplomacy at that time.  I’m uncomfortable that his comments suggest to me that he felt we should have continued to “buy off” North Korea.

l)        In 2002, North Korea restarted its banned nuclear sites, which the IAEA condemned in early 2003.  North Korea claimed to have a workable nuclear device. (CT: Seems unlikely that North Korea could have had a workable nuclear device at this time if it had complied with the Agreed Framework.)

m)    In 2006, the Bush administration decided to support India’s nuclear capability, convincing Congress to approve an exemption to the Atomic Energy Act for this deal.  Eight of India’s 22 nuclear sites were intended for military use, according to http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/18/AR2006121800233.html.  I was appalled by Bush’s attitude that the USA can decide who should be allowed to have nuclear weapons.

n)      More broadly, President Bush turned USA foreign policy on its head by trumpeting our “right” to engage in preemptive war if we feared another country.  This statement particularly upset me as it undermined the USA’s valuable historical position of favoring world peace.  Once trust is lost, it is hard to regain.  Prior to the Bush administration, I had never observed the military-industrial complex about which President Eisenhower had warned us.  Bush’s military-industrial hawks scared me greatly.  Please note that this paragraph does not denigrate the threat of a pre-emptive surgical strike against a nuclear weapons site; I am criticizing Bush for justifying general aggression based on fear.

o)      Republicans repeatedly criticized the Agreed Framework as an appeasement to North Korea.  In doing so, they inadvertently underscored the ability of other countries to blackmail us by developing nuclear weapons.

p)      As noted above, President Obama negotiated what I believe to be a weak agreement with Iran.  Although I did not like his agreement, I concluded that I would have voted for it reluctantly, had I been in Congress, because our Presidents need to have negotiating authority.  If not, other countries will never want to negotiate with our administrations.  See my September 2015 blog.

Diplomacy is a great tactic.  But as Teddy Roosevelt said “Speak softly and carry a big stick.”  It is NOT good diplomacy to incentivize countries to create nuclear weapons.

If we want to avoid nuclear proliferation (which is something we SHOULD want to avoid), there have to be strong negative consequences for a country that develops nuclear weapons.  If strong consequences are assured, we can minimize the number of occurrences.  Diplomacy would also be more effective and could be accomplished (not necessarily in all cases) by avoiding the negative consequences rather than giving incentives.

What could we do?

a)      We could make peaceful nuclear process scientific information readily available.

b)      We could create strong sanctions.  (Note: it is not clear that we could create strong sanctions in every case.  It would be important to have an international agreement in advance that stipulated the strong sanctions and committed all signatories to obey the sanctions, with another set of prescribed sanctions applying to countries which undercut such a sanction.)

c)      We could apply surgical strikes to destroy budding nuclear facilities.  There are great risks in a situation in which one country has unilateral capability to do unilateral strikes of such type.  Many USA citizens are blind to some of the risk because they think we are always right.  Even if we were always right (which I don’t accept), if we were a unilateral international policeman, we would stimulate terrorist attacks against us.  Therefore, it would make sense to consider an international approach.

I don’t know the right answer and the right answer may shift from one situation to another.  However, I fear that we negotiate with a short-term view, inadvertently increasing the risk significantly.